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INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, the federal government made large-scale changes to income assistance, 
replacing the entitlement Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Under TANF, state policymakers 
were given significant freedom to craft their own approaches to public assistance (Nathan 1996). 
It is now generally acknowledged that states have responded in diverse ways that systematically 
reflect their social, economic, and political characteristics (Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Gais and 
Weaver 2000; Soss et al. 2001).  
What is perhaps less often appreciated about welfare reform under TANF is that 
devolution of authority from the federal government to state governments has been accompanied 
by a significant decentralization of policymaking authority within states as well. TANF’s 
emphasis on flexible services and sanctioning virtually ensured that decision making would be 
pushed downward to local implementers, including case managers, who serve as the primary 
“street level bureaucrats” in the new world of welfare service delivery. However, many states 
have further expanded local discretion in TANF implementation by pursuing “second-order” 
devolution – formal transfers of state control to county governments and/or to local 
public/private governance boards (Nathan and Gais 1999). Although there is little systematic 
data on the extent of second-order devolution in welfare policy, a recent study estimates that by 
2001, at least 20 states had engaged in either “slight” or “significant” amounts (Gainsborough 
2003).  
Advocates of welfare decentralization have successfully argued that devolution promotes 
TANF goals by fostering innovation and flexibility in meeting client needs. This is critical to 
TANF’s success, supporters say, because employment barriers are best identified and addressed 
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by local decision makers who know local needs and resources. Decentralization, however, is not 
without its critics. Many observers have pointed out that, with greater discretion for local actors, 
significant variation is likely to emerge in the range of TANF policies and the quality of TANF 
services across local jurisdictions. Some also speculate that variation in local TANF practices 
may be driven less by needs and resources, and more by local values and ideology.  
Understandably, this debate has renewed attention to the ways welfare administrators put 
“policy into action” (Lennon and Corbett 2003). Increasingly, scholars and practitioners are 
asking how policy effects may be mediated by dynamic interactions among incentives, 
organizational forms, cultures, and personnel found in welfare agencies (Ewalt and Jennings 
2004; Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie 2001). In this paper, we contribute to this literature by 
examining the impact of decentralization on one of the most consequential aspects of reform: the 
use of sanctions to penalize recipients who fail to fulfill TANF requirements. Although a number 
of studies have examined the determinants of sanctioning, they have almost exclusively focused 
on client characteristics, and thus have implicitly ignored possible variation in sanctioning due to 
the effects of implementation. Thus, we seek to add to our understanding of sanction outcomes 
by addressing two specific questions. First, to what extent has welfare decentralization led to 
variation in the use of TANF sanctioning across local jurisdictions operating under the same 
sanction policy? Second, are local differences in sanctioning solely a function of variation in 
client characteristics, or is the use of sanctioning also influenced by the local implementation 
environment?  
To answer these questions, we examine sanctioning outcomes in the state of Florida, 
which stands as a leader in welfare decentralization and second-order devolution. Relying on 
administrative data for over 64,000 TANF clients provided by the Florida Department of 
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Children and Families, we conduct a series of analyses which examine the relationship between 
individual sanction outcomes and (1) individual client traits, (2) local social and economic 
conditions, and (3) the local political environment. Our results suggest that a significant amount 
of local variation exists in sanctioning outcomes across the state of Florida, even after controlling 
for the characteristics of TANF clients. Moreover, local patterns in sanctioning outcomes are not 
random, but are systematically related to selected characteristics of the local community, 
including the ideological tendency of the local implementation environment. 
 
WELFARE REFORM AND SANCTIONING UNDER TANF 
Sanctions have long been used by caseworkers to encourage compliance with state 
welfare rules. Over the past decade, however, sanctions have come to play a more prominent role 
in welfare implementation because, under the TANF program, clients now confront stricter work 
requirements, narrower exemption criteria, an expanded menu of behaviors subject to sanction, 
and stronger penalties for noncompliance (Hasenfeld and Powell 2004). Indeed, most analysts 
agree that sanctions have been a linchpin of the successful effort to transform welfare from a 
system focused on providing cash benefits (AFDC), to one focused on the promotion of work 
norms (TANF).  
 Federal legislation requires that TANF clients be subject to a reduction in benefits for 
failure to follow a number of different program rules. The vast majority of sanctions, however, 
are imposed for failure to comply with work requirements. Under TANF, states have a range of 
options in determining exactly how benefits should be reduced, the most important of which 
include (i) whether to reduce the benefit for the adult(s) or the entire family, and (ii) whether and 
when to impose a partial or full reduction of benefits. Seventeen states have adopted the strictest 
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combination of these choices, enforcing what are referred to as “immediate full-family 
sanctions.” In these states, the entire TANF family is immediately removed from the TANF rolls 
at the first instance of noncompliance. Fifteen states use “gradual full-family sanctions,” which 
potentially have the same impact, but only after continued noncompliance. The remaining states 
enforce what are known as “partial sanctions,” which result in a partial reduction of benefits 
(usually affecting only the adult portion of the grant) (Pavetti, Derr and Hesketh 2003).     
 The impact of TANF sanctioning can be measured in a number of ways, all of which 
suggest that sanctioning has had significant effects on both the size and characteristics of the 
TANF caseload. In one of the first studies to document the full impact of sanctions in the TANF 
era, Goldberg and Schott (2000) estimated that the number of families who lost benefits from 
1997 to 1999 was close to 500,000, or a quarter of the reduction in the TANF caseload during 
that period. Other studies have focused on selected states, and have found the incidence of 
sanctioning to be quite significant. Given these estimates, it is not surprising that many state-
level studies of caseload reduction conclude that states with the strictest sanctioning policies 
have experienced as much as a 25 percent greater caseload reduction than states with the least 
stringent policies (Mead 2000; Rector and Youseff 1999). 
 Several studies have also examined the characteristics of sanctioned families, using either 
surveys of TANF recipients or state administrative data. The findings converge on the conclusion 
that sanctioned clients tend to exhibit the characteristics of long-term welfare recipients (Pavetti, 
Derr and Hesketh 2003; Wu 2004). Specifically, these studies find that the probability of being 
sanctioned is related to a client’s race, marital status, age, family size, education level and job 
experience (Born, Caudill and Cordero 1999; Hasenfeld, Ghose, and Hillesland-Larson 2002; 
Kalil, Seefeldt, and Wang 2002; Koraleck 2000; Mancuso and Liner 2001; Westra and Routely 
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2000). Together with findings on the overall incidence of sanctioning, these studies suggest that 
sanctioning practices have greatly affected the characteristics of the TANF population.  
Despite this progress in analyzing sanctions, the literature has paid surprisingly little 
attention to the decentralized implementation processes at the heart of welfare reform. Indeed, 
given recent developments, it is remarkable how little we know about the question that anchors 
this study: In the context of unprecedented decentralization of authority in welfare provision, 
how do local differences in policy implementation affect the imposition of TANF sanctions? 
There is some evidence that, within states, sanction rates vary across locales with different social 
and political characteristics (Keiser, Meuser, and Choi 2004), and different sanctioning 
philosophies and procedures (Pavetti et al. 1998; Born, Caudill and Cordero 1999; Koralek 
2000). These few studies notwithstanding, however, the consequences of dispersed local 
implementation remain a blind spot in our understanding of sanction processes and outcomes. 
Indeed, as Pavetti, Derr and Hesketh  (2003) conclude in their recent review of sanction research, 
“there is scant literature on implementation of sanctions. Although there is some evidence to 
suggest that sanction rates vary from one local office to the next, there has been very little 
research to assess what might contribute to these differences” (25). We address these questions 
below. 
 
DEVOLUTION, DISCRETION, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TANF 
SANCTIONS 
 Our central argument in this paper is that welfare reform has been accompanied by a 
significant, and in recent decades, unprecedented devolution of policymaking discretion to local 
actors in the TANF implementation process. In turn, we expect that this decentralization has 
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resulted in significant and systematic variation in the use of TANF sanctions within states due to 
the exercise of discretion by two sets of actors in the TANF implementation process: (1) local 
TANF supervisors and regional policymakers, whose discretion in TANF implementation has 
increased significantly in many states due to second-order devolution, and (2) TANF case 
managers, who are charged with the responsibility of monitoring client behavior and initiating 
sanctions when TANF rules are violated. Below, we discuss each source of discretion, along 
with hypotheses regarding their collective impact on the implementation of sanctions. 
Second-Order Devolution 
Public and scholarly debate has most often focused on “first-order” devolution of policy 
authority from federal to state governments (Conlan 1998; Osbourne 1988). In the welfare arena, 
significant first-order devolution began during the George H.W. Bush administration when states 
were encouraged to apply for AFDC waivers to experiment with policies such as time limits, 
family caps, and “workfare.” Devolution accelerated in 1996 with the adoption of the TANF 
program, as evidenced by a number of important changes: the shift from a matching grant to a 
block grant, increased state discretion in eligibility determination, and greater flexibility in the 
range of services states can provide to welfare recipients. 
 Under welfare reform, these patterns of first-order devolution have been closely followed 
by “second-order” devolution, defined as the transfer of policy authority from state governments 
to counties or other local governing bodies (Nathan and Gais 1999). Second-order devolution has 
taken two general forms. In the most common model, 14 states have devolved policy authority to 
county governments. Ten of these states previously shared AFDC administrative duties with 
counties, suggesting that stronger capacities at the county level may have encouraged some states 
to devolve authority. These 14 states have varied in the types of duties they have devolved. In 
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states with the most significant devolution, counties have gained substantial control over 
spending (through block grants) and now enjoy significant discretion over TANF work 
requirements, sanctions, time limits, and the use of one-time diversion payments (Gainsborough 
2003). In the second model of second-order devolution, implemented in six states, policy 
authority has been devolved to local/regional governing boards rather than county governments. 
In all six states, welfare services have been linked to state workforce development programs 
operating under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). Welfare and workforce development 
programs are collectively administered through a statewide system of one-stop centers, which are 
overseen by regional workforce boards. These boards, which are mandated by WIA, consist of a 
mixture of public and private officials. The states vary in their exact rules for board composition, 
but in most states at least half of the board’s members must come from the local business 
community (Gainsborough 2003). As with the delegation of authority to counties, there is some 
variation in the power these boards have over TANF policy. According to Gainsborough (2003), 
Florida, Michigan, and Texas have ceded significantly greater amounts of authority to their 
regional workforce boards than have Arkansas, Tennessee and Utah. 
Case Manager Discretion 
As the frontline workers in the public welfare system, case managers have always 
enjoyed significant discretion in their interactions with clients. This discretion has increased 
considerably under TANF due to the increase in the number of rules governing client behavior, 
and the proportion of clients to which these rules must now be applied. Thus, today more than 
ever, case managers exercise a considerable degree of choice as they process clients’ cases, and 
their choices shape what public policies actually mean and do in practice (Lipsky 1980; Prottas 
1979).  
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In principle, supervision may be used to limit or guide case manager discretion. 
Caseworkers, however, rarely operate under the direct watch of supervisors (Prottas 1979). They 
handle cases that are too complex and idiosyncratic to fit neatly under a supervisor’s a priori 
directive, and they process cases at rates that make continual consultation impractical (Maynard-
Moody and Musheno 2003). Administrative rules offer a second source of constraint. But while 
general rules do place broad limits on caseworkers, they cannot be designed to cover all 
conceivable situations, nor can a rule “itself step forward to claim its own instance” (Hart 1961: 
123). Choices must be made about how and when to apply a given rule, and as the number of 
rules grows, so too does the scope of frontline decision making. Rather than eliminating 
discretion, “a profusion of rules can lead to greater freedom because… the bureaucrat must 
choose which rules are appropriate in the present [case]” (Feldman 1992: 166; Lipsky 1980: 14).  
A third possible check on caseworker discretion comes from program clients, who may 
use formal or informal means to limit decisions contrary to their interests. Here again, however, 
theory and evidence suggest a weak constraint. Political economy approaches to social work 
theory argue that welfare clients occupy a dependent position in a relationship defined by 
unequal control of power resources (Hasenfeld 1987). To be sure, clients are active participants 
in welfare interactions who do what they can to subtly influence outcomes, but field research 
suggests that welfare clients feel a keen sense of their dependence on case managers: most report 
that they avoid explicit opposition because they view it as a risky and ineffective maneuver (Soss 
2000). Under the TANF program, moreover, clients have lost entitlement status as well as some 
formal rights of appeal – developments that seem likely to have further weakened clients’ 
abilities to impose limits on caseworker discretion (Mink 2002).  
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In light of these weak constraints, it has become conventional wisdom that “discretion is 
inevitable” in street-level work (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000: 329). Decision making on 
the frontlines is widely recognized as a political process that elaborates, transforms, and 
sometimes subverts the policy intentions of lawmakers (Meier 1999). Such discretion may serve 
as an entry point for unjust and unequal treatment or, alternatively, may permit the tailoring of 
more equitable and humane responses than one would expect based on the rules alone (Keiser 
1999: 88-89). In either case, empirical research suggests that frontline discretion can produce 
wide variation in policy implementation even across a unitary federal program (Keiser and Soss 
1998) or within a highly centralized state welfare program (Riccucci 2005).  
Despite this fact, it remains unclear if or how this discretion might be affecting the 
implementation of TANF sanctions. Based on existing research, there appears to be ample 
opportunity for the exercise of discretion in sanction implementation. This is clearly the case in 
states where important decisions about the structure of sanction policies have been delegated to 
local governments through second-order devolution. However, in the most comprehensive 
review of TANF sanction research to date, Pavetti, Derr and Hesketh (2003: 6) find that even 
when TANF offices operate under a common set of state guidelines, local actors are able to 
exercise considerable discretion at a number of key points in the sanction implementation 
process. These include:  
• the process by which clients are informed of TANF rules and the consequences 
for breaking them 
• the assessment of client needs and identification of clients unable to participate in  
regular work activities  
• the process by which participation in required activities is monitored 
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• the interpretation and application of “good cause” exceptions, which essentially 
grant clients an “excused absence” from participation in required work activities 
• the process by which sanctions are initiated, including the method and timing of 
contact with clients informing them of an impending sanction 
• the process by which clients are re-engaged, including the requirements for 
curing a sanction. 
While all of these points in the implementation process offer an opportunity for local 
policymakers to exercise discretion, perhaps the most important is the interpretation of “good 
cause” exceptions. In addition to federally mandated reasons for excusing violations of work 
requirements, such as the lack of child care, lack of transportation, or illness, good cause 
exceptions may also be granted due to “circumstances beyond the client’s control.” The 
definition of such “circumstances,” at least to some degree, is left to local TANF administrators 
and case managers. Along with other opportunities for exercising discretion, this offers local 
policymakers significant control over the use of sanctioning, as sanction policies may be either 
loosely or narrowly interpreted and applied. Consequently, we expect to see significant 
differences in the implementation of sanctions across local communities due to the exercise of 
local discretion.  
Politics and the Implementation of Sanctions 
Theories of organizational culture emphasize that bureaucratic norms and understandings 
should not be seen as autonomous, insider worldviews, disconnected from their broader social 
milieus; rather, organizational cultures derive from, elaborate upon, and reflect commonsense 
understandings in the broader communities in which they are embedded (Martin 1992; Feldman 
1989; Herzfeld 1992). Local environments may affect organizational operations through 
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democratic pressures, because policymakers respond to local social conditions and needs, or 
because officials share the ideological values of the community at large. Consistent with this 
thinking, a number of studies have found local implementation of public policy to be influenced 
by the local political environment (e.g., Cho et al. 2005; Goggin et al. 1990; Weissert 1994). We 
expect this to be no less true with respect to the implementation of TANF sanctions, especially in 
states that have devolved significant authority over TANF to the local level.   
Our conceptualization of the “political environment” in this study is based on the classic 
liberal-conservative dimension, which has repeatedly been shown to be an important determinant 
of support for welfare generosity in state-level studies of AFDC and TANF (e.g. Barrilleaux, 
Holbrook and Langer 2002; Fording 1997; Soss et al. 2001). In states with significant local 
control, the political characteristics of local environments might affect sanctioning outcomes in 
different ways through the actions of three important local actors in the TANF implementation 
process: case managers, local TANF policymakers, and local advocacy groups.  First, local 
political culture could influence the sanction decisions of case managers who are likely to share 
the political values of the larger community (Riccucci 2005). Survey research has consistently 
found that liberals are generally more likely to attribute the causes of poverty to structural 
explanations and to support welfare assistance (Cook and Barrett 1992). Accordingly, one would 
expect liberal case managers to be more sympathetic to TANF clients in their interpretation and 
application of TANF rules (Morgen 2001). Case managers in more conservative environments, 
on the other hand, may be more likely to attribute poverty to individual shortcomings, and 
therefore be less sympathetic to TANF clients who have fallen out of compliance with TANF 
rules (Keiser, Mueser and Choi 2004).  Thus, we should expect that conservative case managers 
will be more willing to issue sanctions to TANF clients than liberal case managers. 
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Second, in a decentralized policymaking environment one might also expect the political 
orientations of local environments to generate differences in the makeup and behavior of local 
agencies that are responsible for interpreting state sanction policies and guiding the activities of 
case managers in their jurisdiction (Cho et al. 2005).  In some states, county government officials 
may have a significant role in this regard, while in states that have merged their TANF and 
workforce development programs, local employers and community leaders may have significant 
influence through representation on local workforce boards (Gainesborough 2003). In either 
case, we expect the degree of local conservatism to be positively related to stringency in the local 
operating procedures that govern sanctioning, thus leading to higher levels of sanctioning.   
Third and finally, local political environments may influence the overall sanction rates 
through their effects on the presence and strength of local advocacy groups for the poor. Such 
groups could potentially exert influence on local operating procedures, either indirectly through 
advocacy aimed at local TANF policymakers or directly (in some states) through their 
representation on local workforce boards. In addition, contact with liberal welfare advocacy 
groups provides welfare clients with a crucial source of information and support (Handler 1992), 
a factor that some field research suggests can positively affect client-worker interactions (Soss 
2000). Thus, whether the effect is through the actions of case managers, local administrators, or 
local advocacy groups, we expect that the level of local conservatism should be positively related 
to local sanctioning. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Case Selection: Why Study Florida? 
We have chosen Florida as the setting for our study, not because it is typical, but because 
it offers a superb opportunity to examine relevant policy arrangements in strong form, as they 
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intersect with one another to form a dynamic policy transaction (on this logic of case selection, 
see Yin 2003; Ragin 2000). Three kinds of characteristics stand out. First, Florida has pursued 
one of the strongest forms of second-order devolution in the country, blending transfers of 
authority to local actors, program integration, and widespread privatization. Since July 1, 2000, 
the Florida TANF program (Welfare Transitions, WT) and operations related to the WIA 
program have been co-located in one-stop centers and subject to integrated implementation. 
Frontline services have been contracted out to public, non-profit, and for-profit providers 
throughout the entire state. Policy authority for these programs has shifted to the local level in a 
group of 24 public/private partnerships called Regional Workforce Boards (RWBs). These 
RWBs are responsible for strategic planning, policy development, contracting, and oversight of 
local one-stop delivery systems. They are overseen, not by state agencies, but by a statewide 
public/private partnership called Workforce Florida, Inc. (WFI). The Florida Department of 
Children and Families (DCF), a conventional state agency, receives the federal TANF block 
grant and maintains responsibility for eligibility determination. But otherwise, Florida is a 
standout among American states for its strong emphasis on local control and privatization within 
an integrated work-oriented policy system (Botsko et al. 2001: 7).  
Second, Florida scores high on factors that raise the importance of sanction 
implementation. After 1996, Florida adopted “some of the strictest time limits and work 
requirements in the nation” and broadened the pool of clients subject to sanctions by creating 
“few possibilities for exemptions” (Botsko et al. 2001: 4). The sanctions themselves also fall at 
the strong end of the continuum, resulting in an immediate, full-family loss of TANF benefits 
and a reduction of Food Stamp benefits to the fullest extent permitted by federal law (Botsko et 
al. 2001: 6). Moreover, while cross-state comparisons are complicated by the diverse methods 
 14
used to calculate sanction frequency, as we will detail below, our analysis of Florida 
administrative data suggests that Florida employs sanctions at an extremely high rate. Indeed, 
Florida DCF identified sanctions as the most common cause of TANF case closings in fiscal year 
2003, accounting for 31 percent of closings vs. 21 percent for increased earnings.  
Finally, Florida is an ideal choice for our analysis because it offers significant variation 
for one of the most important variables thought to influence sanctions implementation – the local 
political environment. In addition, Florida displays great diversity in local economic and social 
conditions. In combination with Florida’s heavy emphasis on sanctioning and its decentralized 
approach to welfare reform, this variation in political, social and economic characteristics across 
the state provides an ideal setting for a study of the joint effects of these characteristics on local 
sanction implementation.  
Data and Hypotheses 
To examine the determinants of sanction usage, we employ an event history analysis of 
the initiation of a sanction. Our sample consists of individual-level administrative data for all 
adults receiving TANF in Florida, supplemented with contextual data indicating how local 
implementing environments vary across 66 of the state’s 67 counties.1 Using these data, we 
estimate event history models of TANF sanctioning, where a dichotomous dependent variable 
indicates whether or not a client has been sanctioned, and the independent variables include 
individual-level measures capturing client effects, and county-level measures capturing 
community-context effects.2  Based upon past research on sanctions, we include a number of 
variables to control for variation in clients’ individual characteristics. These include gender, age 
                                                 
1 Administrative data for Glades county are unavailable. 
2 We provide detailed variable descriptions in the appendix, including data sources and 
descriptive statistics for each variable used in the analyses that follow. 
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of client, single parent status, wage income, and education level. We also control for a client’s 
race/ethnicity by identifying clients as belonging to one of three mutually exclusive racial/ethnic 
group combinations: black, Hispanic, and white (non-Hispanic).3  Most of these variables have 
been found to be important determinants of individual sanctioning outcomes in past research 
(Wu 2004; Born, Caudill and Cordero 1999; Hasenfeld, Ghose and Hillesland-Larson 2002; 
Kalil, Seefeldt and Wang 2002; Koraleck 2000; Mancuso and Liner 2001).  
To capture the effects of the local political environment, we rely on a measure of local 
political ideology, conceptualized in traditional liberal-conservative terms. Unlike the case for 
individual or state-level research, estimating the relationship between ideology and welfare 
generosity at the local level poses a difficult challenge due to the lack of a readily available 
measure of local ideology. In light of this, the most common strategy used to measure local 
ideology is to rely on county partisanship, as reflected in election returns (e.g. Keiser, Meuser 
and Choi 2004; Cho et al. 2005). However, it is well-known that partisanship tends to be 
imperfectly related to political ideology (Miller 1999), and therefore this strategy is likely to 
introduce measurement error into our analysis. As an alternative to relying on local partisanship, 
we construct an original measure of local political ideology which we believe comes closer to 
measuring the concept we are truly interested in measuring. For each county, we coded election 
results for 18 ideologically relevant constitutional amendments that appeared on the ballot 
throughout the entire state between 1996 and 2004.4 Based on the results of a factor analysis of 
support for all 18 amendments, we then used the factor scores to create an index of county 
ideology for our analysis of sanctioning outcomes. The index is scaled to range from 0 to 1, with 
                                                 
3 A very small percentage (<2%) of cases are classified as “other race” by the state. We omit 
these individuals from our sample. We also restrict our analysis to citizens, due to the unique 
challenges faced by noncitizens on TANF. 
4 A list of the subjects of these amendments is presented in the appendix. 
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0 representing the most liberal county (Gadsen), and 1 representing the most conservative county 
(Clay).  
We validated our measure of county conservatism in two ways. First, if our measure of 
local ideology is valid, we expect that it should be at least moderately related to local 
partisanship. This proves to be the case as the simple correlation between our measure of county 
conservatism and a measure of the average Republican vote share in recent presidential elections 
is reasonably strong at .65 (p < .05, N=67).5 Second, we merged survey results from two 
different statewide surveys that measure liberal-conservative self-identification at the individual 
level. We then calculated county means across these survey responses for the 8 counties with at 
least 50 respondents represented in the merged sample.6 The relationship between our 
amendment-based measure of county conservatism and the survey-based measure for these 8 
counties is presented in the scatterplot shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, our conservatism 
index corresponds well with the survey-based measure as the two measures are correlated at .85. 
Thus, we are confident that we have constructed a valid measure of local ideology. 
(Figure 1) 
In addition to the effects of local ideology, we also consider one additional dimension of 
the local political environment: the local racial context. Studies of racial politics and policy 
outcomes have often found that the racial context has a significant impact on racially relevant 
policy outcomes, either through the effects of a “racial threat” felt by the white majority (Blalock 
1967; Key 1949), or the effects of increased minority political power (Keech 1968). While we 
                                                 
5 Specifically, our measure of the Republican vote share is a measure of the two-party vote share 
in the presidential elections of 1996, 2000, and 2004. 
6 The surveys used to create these scores were the Florida Voter Panel Study conducted in 1999 
(ICPSR 3435), and a CBS/New York Times survey of Florida voters conducted in 2000 (ICPSR 
3223). The average sample size for the eight counties used in this analysis was 95. 
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expect that either effect might exist, if Keiser, Mueser and Choi’s (2004) results for Missouri 
offer any guidance, we should expect that sanction rates will be lower in counties with larger 
minority populations. Accordingly, we include the percentage of the county population that is 
black and Hispanic, respectively.  
In addition to variables representing the local political environment, we also include 
additional contextual measures to capture the effects of local labor markets and the extent of 
local employment opportunities, which are expected to affect sanctioning outcomes in one of two 
ways. First, where employment opportunities are relatively numerous and attractive, TANF 
clients may be more likely to work enough hours to avoid falling out of compliance with TANF 
rules. Alternatively, local labor market conditions may also influence sanctioning outcomes 
through their effects on local administrators and case managers who may be more sympathetic to 
TANF clients, and thus less supportive of stringent enforcement of TANF rules, when job 
opportunities are less numerous or less attractive. To capture these potential effects, we include 
the county unemployment rate, the poverty rate, the level of urbanization (as measured by county 
population), and the annual local wage in food service/drinking establishments.  
We also include a measure of the local TANF caseload, measured as the number of 
TANF adults (per 1,000 county population). As the caseload size increases, we might expect 
that, all else equal, administrative pressures to reduce the caseload would result in an increase in 
sanctioning. Alternatively, as the caseload size increases, if the number of case managers 
remains fixed, individual case managers may have less time to closely monitor TANF clients for 
violations of rules, thus resulting in a lower rate of sanctioning. Finally, we control for possible 
seasonal effects in sanctioning by including dummy variables for each calendar month.   
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RESULTS 
 As background to our analysis, we first provide a detailed description of the Florida 
TANF population, followed by an examination of aggregate trends in sanctioning across time 
and across counties. We then present the results of our multivariate analysis, which relies on an 
event history model of TANF sanctioning to estimate the individual and contextual determinants 
of TANF sanctioning. 
Florida’s TANF Caseload 
 Our TANF administrative data span the period January 2000 through early 2004. During 
this period, the size of the adult caseload decreased significantly, as it has in many other states. 
This can be seen by examining Figure 2, which displays monthly caseload trends for the entire 
state. In panel A of the figure, we see that in early 2000, the TANF caseload exceeded 40,000 
adults.  However, the caseload steadily decreased in size throughout 2000 and early 2001, 
reaching a period low of just under 25,000 adults in mid-2001. Since that time, the average 
monthly caseload has remained relatively stable, displaying seasonal fluctuations around a mean 
of approximately 27,000 TANF adults from mid-2001 through the first quarter of 2004. 
 The lower panel (B) of Figure 2 displays monthly TANF caseload trends by ethnic/racial 
identification. The figure clearly indicates that throughout the entire period, black adults have 
comprised the largest share of the adult TANF population, representing nearly half of all TANF 
adults in the early months of 2000. After 2000, the monthly percentage of black TANF adults 
declined and has averaged 43-44% since 2001. White and Hispanic TANF recipients have 
comprised nearly identical shares of the TANF population, although in recent years the number 
of white adults has slightly, but consistently, outnumbered Hispanic adults on a monthly basis. 
Given these changes in the relative shares of each racial/ethnic group since 2000, this suggests 
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that a slightly disproportionate share of the decline in the TANF caseload that was experienced 
during this period was due to a greater number of blacks, and to some degree Hispanics, leaving 
the TANF rolls. 
(Figure 2) 
Our data indicate that approximately 268,000 adults received TANF for at least one 
month during the period spanning January 2000 – April 2004. In Table 1, we present a snapshot 
of selected characteristics of these adults, along with comparative figures reported by the federal 
government for the national TANF population during fiscal year 2002. Like TANF clients in 
other states, TANF adults in Florida are overwhelming female, single, and disproportionately 
populated by racial and ethnic minorities. The average age of TANF adults in Florida was 
approximately 31, which is almost identical to the national figure. In contrast to national figures, 
our data suggest that Florida’s TANF population is slightly less educated and somewhat more 
likely to consist of noncitizens than the national TANF population. Overall, however, Table 1 
suggests that Florida’s TANF population is highly representative of the national TANF 
population and thus provides for an ideal laboratory for exploring the correlates of sanctioning.   
Statewide Sanctioning Rates 
 Along with many other states, the state of Florida employs immediate, full-family 
sanctions to penalize clients who fall out of compliance with TANF requirements. In addition to 
having a relatively strict written policy, an inspection of statewide sanctioning data suggests that 
sanctions are rather frequently enforced in Florida as well. We begin our analysis of sanctions by 
examining aggregate trends in sanctioning over time. These trends are displayed in panels A and 
B of Figure 3. In panel A, we can see that the number of sanctions issued each month was 
relatively stable between 2000 and 2004, with occasional fluctuations around a mean of about 
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3200 sanctions per month. To provide some perspective on this figure, Figure 3A also displays 
the number of TANF exits that occurred for reasons unrelated to sanctions, or what we refer to as 
non-sanction exits. Since 2001, non-sanction exits have remained stable, averaging 
approximately 5800 exits each month. This therefore implies that from 2001 through 2003, 
sanction exits averaged slightly more than one-third of all monthly TANF exits in Florida. Panel 
B of Figure 3 provides additional perspective and displays sanctioning frequency as a percentage 
of the entire TANF adult caseload. Since the stabilization of the caseload in 2001, the percentage 
of TANF adults sanctioned each month has averaged just over 11 percent. 
(Figure 3) 
While Florida does appear to rely heavily on sanctions as a policy tool, this conclusion 
would be further supported by a comparison of sanction rates in Florida to sanction rates in other 
states. This task is complicated, to some degree, by inconsistencies in the severity of sanction 
policies across states. That is, in states that impose some form of partial sanction, TANF case 
managers may be more willing to issue a sanction because the consequences for TANF clients 
are less severe. However, despite the fact that Florida’s sanction policy is the strictest allowed by 
federal law, sanction rates in Florida appear to be quite high when compared to other states. The 
most commonly reported sanction statistic is the percentage of cases closed due to sanctions. As 
we have seen, over the period of our study, approximately one third of all case closings in 
Florida are due to sanctions. In contrast, the most recent data reported by the federal government 
(for fiscal year 2002) show that nationwide, only 7 percent of all case closings were due to 
sanctions.7   
                                                 
7 These data are reported by the Office of Family Assistance in their Sixth Annual Report to 
Congress (http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/annualreport6/chapter10/chap10.htm). 
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Recognizing the fact that such statistics are in part a function of the number of non-
sanction exits, Pavetti et al. (2004) recommend a “purer” measure of sanctioning which is based 
on the cumulative incidence of sanctioning for a panel of clients over a significant period of 
time. Using this method, they measured the sanction rate in three states that use immediate, full-
family sanctions – Illinois, New Jersey, and South Carolina. For Illinois and New Jersey, they 
observed the cohort of adult TANF recipients who entered TANF in November of 2001 and 
found that after 18 months, 13 percent of the New Jersey cohort, and 17 percent of the Illinois 
cohort, had been sanctioned. In South Carolina, they could only observe clients for 10 months 
and found that 5 percent were ultimately sanctioned. We estimated comparable sanctioning rates 
in Florida by relying on the same panel method utilized by Pavetti et al. (2004). Based on the 
cohort of Florida’s adult TANF recipients who entered TANF in November, 2001, we found that 
after 10 months, 43 percent had been sanctioned at least once, and after 18 months, the sanction 
rate increased to 47 percent.  Given the magnitude of the difference in the sanctioning rates 
between Florida and these three other states, there is good reason to believe that Florida is among 
the leaders in the use of sanctions. 
Local Variation in Sanctioning 
  Although it appears that the mean sanction rate in Florida may indeed be relatively high 
compared to other states, we expect that there has been significant variation around that mean 
due to the highly decentralized nature of TANF implementation in Florida, To test this 
expectation, we calculated county sanction rates using a method similar to the panel method 
advocated by Pavetti, et al. (2004), but with a few modifications. First, rather than relying on one 
specific cohort, we observed sanctioning outcomes for the 24 cohorts entering TANF from 
January 2001 through December 2002. Second, within each cohort we limited our observation to 
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“new” TANF clients, defined as clients who did not receive TANF for a minimum of 12 
consecutive months prior to entering TANF.  Third, we focused exclusively on the first TANF 
spell for each cohort, where we defined a spell as continuous months of TANF receipt. And 
fourth, we examined each cohort for a maximum of 12 consecutive months. To calculate a 
county’s sanction rate, we first calculated the sanction rate for each cohort as the percentage of 
the cohort that exited TANF due to a sanction. We then calculated the average sanction rate 
across the 24 cohorts to arrive at a final county sanction rate for each of the 66 counties in our 
dataset. 
 Based on these calculations, the mean sanction rate across all 66 counties was 39%. This 
means that for the 24 cohorts of new TANF clients entering TANF in 2001 and 2002, at least 
39% were sanctioned off TANF during their first TANF spell.8 As anticipated, there has been 
significant variation in county sanction rates during our study period. This is evident in Figure 4, 
which displays county sanction rates for the upper and lower quartiles of the county distribution. 
As can be seen in the figure, four counties display a sanction rate of less than 30%, with 
Hamilton county exhibiting the lowest sanction rate in the sample at 22%. In contrast, three 
counties sanctioned at a rate of at least 50%, with Okeechobee displaying the highest sanction 
rate of all counties at 53%. Thus, the maximum sanction rate in our sample exceeded the 
minimum sanction rate by 141%. These differences are both statistically and substantively 
significant, and suggest that sanction implementation is carried out in fundamentally different 
ways across the state. 
(Figure 4) 
                                                 
8 As these calculations are based on a maximum spell of 12 months, we underestimate the first 
spell sanction rate to the extent that clients were sanctioned after 12 months. However, we find 
that spells of more than 12 consecutive months in Florida are extremely rare. 
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 Before proceeding to the multivariate analysis, we provide a preliminary test of the 
influence of the political environment on sanctions implementation by examining the bivariate 
relationship between the local sanction rates presented in Figure 4 and our index of county 
conservatism. This relationship is displayed in the form of a scatterplot in Figure 5, and provides 
some initial evidence of a relationship between local sanctioning outcomes and the political 
environment. This relationship is also confirmed by the estimated regression line (b=.08, p=.03), 
which is also plotted in the figure. Despite the statistical significance of this relationship, it is 
clearly far from perfect and suggests that there are likely many other factors that may be 
influencing sanctioning outcomes as well. Thus, we now move to a more detailed and rigorous 
multivariate analysis of sanctioning outcomes that relies on individual level data. 
(Figure 5) 
An Event History Model of Sanction Initiation 
 Our event history analysis relies on individual level administrative data on TANF adults 
provided by the Florida DCF, supplemented with data on county political and socioeconomic 
characteristics. Specifically, our sample consists of all new adult TANF clients entering TANF 
during the 24-month period from January 2001 through December 2002.9 Thus, our entire period 
of analysis extends from January 2001 (first cohort enters) through November 2003 (12th month 
of spell for last cohort). The dependent variable for our analysis is a dichotomous variable that 
takes on a value of 1 in the month that a client is sanctioned. We follow each of the 24 cohorts 
for up to a maximum of 12 consecutive months, ending our observation of the case at the spell’s 
termination or at the 12-month mark, whichever comes first. Clients who exit for reasons other 
than sanction, or who are not sanctioned by the 12th month of the spell, are treated as right-
                                                 
9 We define “new” TANF clients as those clients who have spent at least twelve continuous 
months without TANF benefits.  
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censored. For the purposes of this paper, we restrict our attention to the first TANF spell for each 
individual during this period, where we define a spell as continuous months of TANF receipt. As 
defined, and accounting for a small percentage of cases for which values of some variables are 
missing, our total sample size exceeds 64,000 individuals and 183,000 person-months.  
We estimate our models using the Cox proportional hazards model. The advantage of the 
Cox model is that it allows for flexible, nonparametric estimation of the baseline hazard, or what 
we might think of as the effect of spell duration on the probability of sanction (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).10 For each of the variables in our models, we report the estimated 
hazard ratio, which reflects the proportional change in the risk of sanction given a one-unit 
increase in the independent variable of interest. Given the multilevel character of our data, the p-
values reported in Table 2 are based on standard errors that are adjusted for error correlation 
within counties. 
The results for our event history model are presented in columns I-IV of Table 2. We 
limit our attention for the moment to column I, which displays results for a model which is 
restricted to the effects of individual-level variables. Much as we would expect, we find that 
sanctions are significantly related to clients’ individual traits. Specifically, TANF sanctions are 
significantly more likely to be applied to the small number of men in the program, relative to the 
large majority of adult women in the program. We also find that the probability of being 
sanctioned is higher for clients who are younger, who are heads of two-parent families, and who 
have less than a high school or college education. These results are largely consistent with the 
results of past studies (Born, Caudill and Cordero 1999; Hasenfeld, Ghose and Hillesland-Larson 
2002; Kalil, Seefeldt and Wang 2002; Keiser, Mueser and Choi 2004; Koraleck 2000; Mancuso 
                                                 
10 We have replicated our findings using other estimation methods as well, including parametric 
methods (Weibull), and a discrete-time (logit) model. 
 25
and Liner 2001; Westra and Routely 2000; Wu et al. 2003). In addition, these effects are 
consistent across the alternative specifications presented in Table 2 (which we discuss in more 
detail below). 
(Table 2) 
The effects of race and ethnicity are more complicated, as model diagnostics determined 
that these effects vary in magnitude across the TANF spell. We deal with this issue by including 
multiplicative terms that include the race/ethnicity of client and a simple counter variable (1-12) 
representing the month of the TANF spell (Black*Month of Spell, Hispanic*Month of Spell). We 
find that in the earliest months of a participation spell, white clients are significantly more likely 
to be sanctioned than black or Hispanic clients. However, as the length of the spell grows longer, 
black and Hispanic clients become more likely to experience a sanction than their white 
counterparts (however in the case of Hispanic clients, the difference at the upper range of the 
spell is not statistically significant). Indeed, by the 9th month of the spell, black clients are 
predicted to be sanctioned at a rate that is anywhere from 22-35% higher than that of whites 
(depending upon model specification). This interaction between race/ethnicity and month of spell 
is extremely robust and underscores the importance of employing a longitudinal design, such as 
event history analysis, to study racial dynamics in TANF sanctioning.  
We now move to the effects of the local political climate, which are reflected in models 
II-IV. Model II adds our local conservatism index to the specification presented in model I and 
finds that the risk of sanction is significantly higher in conservative counties, even after 
controlling for clients’ individual traits. Specifically, the hazard ratio suggests that holding 
individual traits constant, the risk of sanction in the most conservative county is 67% higher than 
in the most liberal county. Model III adds the rest of our contextual variables to the specification, 
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and finds that local ideology is still significantly related to sanctioning, though the effect is 
diminished to some degree. Finally, model IV reflects the same specification as model III, but 
drops Dade county from the sample as a test of robustness. Dade county is by far the largest 
county represented in our sample, claiming 14% of all TANF clients in our estimation sample, 
and 17% of all person-month observations. In addition, Dade county is atypical of Florida 
counties in many important respects due to its racially mixed population and the diversity of 
organizations (i.e. public, private and nonprofit) involved in TANF implementation. Overall, the 
results for model IV are very similar to those for model III, suggesting that the presence of Dade 
county in the sample does not bias our conclusions. In fact, the effect of local ideology is even 
stronger when Dade county is removed from the sample. 
While the results presented in Table 2 suggest that the effect of local ideology is 
statistically as well as substantively important, an important weakness of the hazard ratio is that 
it is limited to describing the relative risk of sanction at a single point in time (i.e. a given month 
within the TANF spell). We therefore provide further perspective on the magnitude of this effect 
in Figure 6 by examining the cumulative impact of local ideology over the course of the entire 
TANF spell. Specifically, Figure 6 plots cumulative survival rates across two contexts – the most 
liberal county and the most conservative county – for a typical TANF client. Based on our 
results, the probability that a typical TANF client residing in the most conservative county will 
survive through the 12th month of a TANF spell without a sanction is approximately .20. In 
contrast, the probability that the same (hypothetical) client will survive through the 12th month 
without a sanction in the most liberal county is approximately .40, or twice that of the survival 
rate in the most conservative county. Of course, very few clients will ever experience a 12 month 
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TANF spell, but this simulation does provide additional perspective on the substantive impact of 
local ideology on sanctioning outcomes. 
(Figure 6) 
Returning to the effects of other variables in our model, the effects of the local 
racial/ethnic context provide some evidence that sanctioning is reduced in areas where the 
minority population is large. This provides support for the notion that racial/ethnic minorities are 
able to exert influence over TANF policy outcomes, however we are unable to determine if this 
effect is due to indirect pressure on TANF officials, or through greater representation among 
case managers and TANF administrators. The results are strongest for Hispanic%, as the 
coefficient reaches statistical significance in model III. However, when Dade county is dropped 
from the sample, this coefficient falls just below the threshold for significance. The coefficient 
for Black% is consistently negative, and while it does not reach the .05 threshold for statistical 
significance in any of our specifications, it consistently comes close to significance in each 
model in Table 2 (.10 < p < .20, two-tailed).    
 In addition to the local political environment, the results in Table 2 suggest that 
sanctioning outcomes are also influenced by the socioeconomic environment in which TANF is 
implemented. We find that all else equal, the risk of sanction is greater in large urban counties, 
and where poverty rates are relatively higher. These results may reflect the effects of 
environments in which jobs are less accessible, or for other reasons specific to the local 
environment, TANF clients find the demands of the program more difficult to meet. 
Interestingly, the size of the TANF caseload is negatively related to sanctioning. This lends some 
support to the possibility that case managers with heavy caseloads have less time to spend 
monitoring their clients, or that they find it more difficult to follow through with the 
 28
administrative burden of the sanction process. Contrary to expectations, we find relatively weak 
effects for two aspects of local labor markets, as neither unemployment rates nor local wage 
levels proved to be significant predictors of sanctions. 
 Finally, in addition to the effects of individual traits and variables reflecting 
characteristics of the local community, we also find evidence of a seasonal pattern to 
sanctioning, as reflected in the set of coefficients reflecting the effects of each calendar month. 
This seasonal effect is graphically displayed in Figure 7, where the bars in the figure represent 
the hazard ratio associated with each monthly effect. As the omitted (i.e. baseline) month in the 
analysis, the hazard ratio for August is set at 1.0. Thus, the values of the remaining hazard ratios 
represented in the figure can be interpreted as the proportional increase in the risk of sanction in 
that month, compared to the risk of sanction in the month of August. The pattern of the bars in 
Figure 7 suggests that the risk of sanction is higher during the winter months and early spring, 
peaking in the month of March. The risk of sanction then declines during the summer and early 
fall, reaching its minimum level in August. This pattern corresponds almost exactly with 
fluctuations in the tourist industry, a fact which is confirmed by the line in the graph representing 
monthly (statewide) taxable sales generated from tourism and recreation. The relationship 
between these seasonal effects and tourism sales is extremely strong (r = .95), suggesting that 
sanctioning patterns may, in some way, be related to labor market demands that are driven by the 
tourist economy. The causal mechanism connecting sanctioning and tourism remains 
undetermined, and certainly deserves further investigation.    
(Figure 7) 
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CONCLUSION 
Within the TANF program, sanction policies have become the key tool for signaling 
clients that they must take the welfare-to-work philosophy seriously and meet the slate of 
obligations detailed in their Individual Responsibility Plans, or they will lose access to cash 
assistance. Given the importance of sanctioning to clients’ well-being, a number of studies have 
examined the determinants of sanctioning to gain a better understanding of who is being 
sanctioned, and why. Although this literature has furthered our understanding of the impact of 
sanctioning, it has been almost exclusively “client-centered” in its theoretical approach by 
neglecting to consider the effects of the welfare system and implementation. Our analysis 
attempts to shed some light on these effects by examining local variation in sanctioning across 
the state of Florida, which stands as a leader in the use of sanctioning. Based on our findings, 
three issues strike us as meriting special attention.  
First, several studies have shown that states have used the discretion granted to them 
through first-order devolution to tailor their welfare programs to the ideological tastes of their 
citizens (e.g. Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss et al. 2001). As we have seen, however, welfare 
reform has also been characterized by second-order devolution, thus increasing the importance of 
local discretion in welfare reform outcomes. Has second-order devolution had a similar effect? 
Our analysis suggests that at least in one state, second-order devolution may indeed be working 
in a similar fashion. Based on our analysis of sanctioning outcomes in Florida, we find 
significant variation in local sanctioning practices, even after controlling for such important 
individual traits as education, race, and income. More importantly, we find strong evidence that 
local differences are not random, but instead are strongly tied to local political values. We cannot 
pinpoint the causal mechanism that is driving this finding, yet there is good reason to believe it is 
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rooted in the decentralized nature of TANF implementation in Florida, along with the inherent 
discretion present in the sanctioning process. 
A second important finding that emerges from our analysis is the importance of social 
class variables in determining sanctioning outcomes. Consistent with prior research, we find that 
individuals with lower levels of human capital, as reflected by lower education and income 
levels, are significantly more likely to be sanctioned. In addition to these individual level effects, 
however, we also find evidence that class exhibits a contextual effect, as the probability of 
sanction is higher among clients who live in poverty-stricken areas. Further research is needed to 
pinpoint the causal mechanism that is driving this effect, but to the extent that it is due to local 
variation in economic opportunity, this suggests that policy solutions which take the local 
economic context into account may be warranted. 
Finally, our analysis underscores the potential importance of using a longitudinal design 
to study sanctioning outcomes. This conclusion is supported by at least two important aspects of 
our findings - the existence of a seasonal pattern to sanctioning, and the relationship between 
race and sanctioning. Our analysis suggests that holding other variables constant, the overall rate 
of sanctioning in Florida is higher during the peak tourist season than it is during the summer 
months. This suggests that cross-sectional studies, which are conducted in a relatively short 
period of time, may reach conclusions that cannot be reliably generalized to rest of the year. 
Similarly, we also find that racial and ethnic differences in sanctioning are related to the length 
of the TANF spell. This suggests that sanctioning disparity may be a more complex phenomenon 
than we have thus far understood, and is therefore best studied using a longitudinal design.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Variable Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics for Analyses Presented in Table 2 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Definition                             Mean 
  Standard           Minimum 
  Deviation      & Maximum 
 
Individual Characteristics 
    
 
Gender 0=Female, 1=Male .136 .343 0-1 
 
Age 
 
Client age, in years           30.7 9.04 18-102 
 
Single-Parent 
 
1=Single parent, 
0=otherwise, based on 
# of adults in family .797 .402 0-1 
 
Wage Income 
 
Wage income, from 
previous quarter 562.578 1336.728 0-76013 
 
Education (reference = >12 years) 
    
     Less than H.S. Education 1= <12 years education, 
0 =otherwise  .464 .499 0-1 
     
     H.S. Education 
 
1= 12 years education, 
0 =otherwise .345 .475 0-1 
 
Race/Ethnic (referece=white, non-Hisp) 
 
 
   
     Black 1=black,  
0=otherwise .407 .491 0-1 
      
     Hispanic 
 
1=Hispanic, 
0=otherwise .190 .392 0-1 
 
    Month of Spell  
 
Month of Spell for each 
client 
 
 
2.895 
 
 
2.386 
 
 
1-12 
 
Political Environment 
    
 
Local Conservatism Index See appendix B .461 .220 0-1 
 
County Black Population % 
 
% black in county of 
client (Census, April 
2000) 15.613 7.288 2.1 –  57.1 
 
County Hispanic Population % 
 
%Hispanic in county of 
client (Census, April 
2000) 18.148 18.939 1.5 – 57.3 
 
Economic Environment 
    
Average Wage – Food Service/Drinking 
Places 
Average annual income 
for employees (2002) 
(NAICS 722) 
 
 
12624.76 
 
 
1888.585 
 
 
7795- 16674 
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County Unemployment Rate (t-1) Unemployment rate in 
county of client, 
measured each month 
(Florida Research and 
Economic Database) 
 
 
 
 
5.344 
 
 
 
 
1.635 
 
 
 
 
1.7  - 19.7 
 
County Poverty Rate 
 
 
 
 
County poverty rate for 
all persons in 2000 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 
Small Area Income & 
Poverty Estimates) 
 
 
 
 
 
12.583 
 
 
 
 
 
3.298 
 
 
 
 
 
6.9  -  24.2 
  
TANF Caseload (per 1000 county 
population) 
 
Ratio of county TANF 
caseload to total county 
population * 1000 
 
 
 
2.092 
 
 
 
1.083 
 
 
 
.142 - 6.907 
 
Total Population 
 
Total Population for 
Each County (2000), in 
millions 
 
 
 
.899 
 
 
 
.753 
 
 
 
.007 -  2.253 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Construction of Index of County Political Ideology  
 
 
 To construct our index of local ideology we collected data on 18 ideologically relevant 
constitutional amendments that appeared on a statewide ballot for ratification from 1996 through 
2004.  We computed the percentage of “yes” votes for each amendment, for each county, and 
conducted a factor analysis using all 18 amendments (thus 18 variables, N=67 counties). The 
subjects of these amendments are listed in the table below. 
 
Year     Amendment 
96        Tax Limitation 
96        Pollution Costs 
96        Sugar Fee 
98        Death Penalty (For) 
98        Tax Exemption 
98        Public Education 
98        Basic Rights 
98        Election Reform 
98        Gun Control 
00        Public Transit 
02        Smoking Ban 
02        Universal Pre-K 
02        Class Size Reduction 
02        Animal Cruelty 
04        Abortion Rights (Limit) 
04        Minimum Wage 
04        Medical Compensation Limits 
04        Slot Machines 
 
 
 34
REFERENCES 
 
Barrilleaux, Charles, Thomas Holbrook, and Laura Langer. 2002. "Electoral Competition,  
Legislative Balance, and American State Welfare Policy," American Journal of Political 
Science 46 (April) 415-27. 
Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations. New York: Wiley. 
Born, Catherine, Pamela Caudill, and Melinda Cordero. 1999. “Life After Welfare: A Look at 
Sanctioned Families.” Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland, School of Social Work.  
Botsko, Christopher, Kathleen Snyder, and Jacob Leos-Urbel. 2001. Recent Changes in Florida 
Welfare and Work, Child Care, and Child Welfare Systems. Washington, DC: Urban 
Institute. 
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, and Bradford Jones.  2004.  Event History Modeling: A Guide for 
Social Scientists.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Conlan, Timothy J. 1998. From New Federalism to Devolution: Twenty-Five Years of 
Intergovernmental Reform. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Cook, Fay Lomax and Edith J. Barrett. 1992. Support for the American Welfare State: The 
Views of Congress and the Public. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Ewalt, Jo Ann, and Edward T. Jennings, Jr. 2004. “Administration, Governance, and Policy 
Tools in Welfare Implementation.” Public Administration Review 64(4):449-462. 
Feldman, Martha. 1989. Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making. 
Stanford University Press.  
Feldman, Martha S. 1992. “Social Limits to Discretion: An Organizational View.” In Keith 
Hawkins, ed. The Uses of Discretion. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp.163-84. 
Fellowes, Matthew and Gretchen Rowe. 2004. “Politics and the New American Welfare  
           States.” American  Journal of Political Science. 48(2): 362-73. 
Fording, Richard C.  1997. “The Conditional Effect of Violence as a Political Tactic: Mass 
Insurgency, Welfare Generosity, and Electoral Context in the American States.”  
American Journal of Political Science 41:1-29. 
Gainsborough, Juliet F.. 2003. “To devolve or Not to Devolve? Welfare Reform in the States.” 
Policy Studies Journal. 31(4): 603-23. 
Gais, Thomas L. and R. Weaver. 2002. State Policy Choices under Welfare Reform, Policy Brief 
No. 21, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, April.  
Goggin, Malcolm L, Ann Bowman, James Lester, and Laurence O'Toole. 1990. Implementation 
Theory and Practice: Toward a Third Generation. New York: Scott Foresman. 
Goldberg, Heidi and Liz Schott. 2000. A Compliance Oriented Approach to Sanctions in State 
and County TANF Programs. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.  
Handler, Joel F. 1992. “Discretion: Power, Quiescence, and Trust.” In Keith Hawkins, ed. The 
Uses of Discretion. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hart, H.L.A. 1961. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, T.J. Ghose, and Kandyce Hillesland-Larson. 2002. “At Risk of Being 
Sanctioned: Comparing Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned Welfare Recipients in 
California’s CalWORKS.” Paper presented at the Association for Public Policy Analysis 
and Management’s 24th Annual Research Conference, November 7-9, 2002, Dallas, TX.  
Hasenfeld, Yeheskel. 1987. "Power in Social Work Practice." Social Service Review. 
(September): 469-483. 
 35
Hasenfeld, Yeheskel and Lisa Evens Powell. 2004. “The Role of Non-Profit Agencies in the 
Provision of Welfare-to-Work Services.” Administration in Social Work 28(3/4): 91-110.  
Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, Toorjo Ghose, Kadyce Larson. 2004. “The Logic of Sanctioning Welfare 
Recipients: An Empirical Assessment.” Social Service Review. 78(2): 304-19.  
Herzfeld, Michael.  1992.  The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots 
of Western Bureaucracy. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Kalil, Ariel, Kristin S. Seefeldt, and Hui-chen Wang. 2002. “Sanctions and Material Hardship 
under TANF.” Social Service Review 76(4): 643–62. 
Keech, William R., 1968 [1981]. The Impact of Negro Voting: The Role of the Vote the  
Quest for Equality. Chicago: Rand McNally, Westport, CT: Greenwood. 
Keiser, Lael R. 1999. “State Bureaucratic Discretion and the Administration of Social Welfare 
Programs: The Case of Social Security Disability." Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory. 9(1): 87-107. 
Keiser, Lael R. and Joe Soss. 1998. “With Good Cause: Bureaucratic Discretion and the Politics 
of Child Support Enforcement.” American Journal of Political Science. 42(4): 1133-56. 
Keiser, Lael R., Peter Meuser, and Seung-Whan Choi. 2004. “Race, Bureaucratic Discretion, and 
the Implementation of Welfare Reform.” Journal of Political Science. 48(2): 314-27. 
Key, V.O., Jr. 1949. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: Knopf. 
Koralek, Robin. 2000. “South Carolina Family Independence Program Process Evaluation.” 
Prepared for South Carolina Department of Social Services. Washington, DC: The Urban 
Institute. 
Lennon, Mary Clare and Thomas Corbett. 2003. Policy into Action: Implementation Research 
and Welfare Reform. Washigton, DC: Urban Institute Press.  
Lipsky, Michael. 1980. Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Mancuso, David, and Vanessa L. Lindler. 2001. “Examining the Circumstances of  
Welfare Leavers and Sanctioned Families in Sonoma County [CA], Final Report.” 
Burlingame, CA: The SPHERE Institute. 
Martin, Joanne. 1992. Cultures in Organizations: Three Perspectives. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Maynard-Moody, Steven and Michael Musheno. 2000. "State Agent or Citizen Agent: Two 
Narratives of Discretion." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 10( 2): 
329-58. 
Maynard-Moody, Steven and Michael Musheno. 2003. Cops, Teachers, Counselors:  
Stories from the Front Lines of Public Service. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press. 
Mead, Lawrence M.  2000. “Governmental Quality and Welfare Reform.” Paper  
presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. 
Washington,DC, September 1, 2000. 
Meier, Kenneth J. 1999. Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policy making in the Forth Branch  
 of Government. California: Brooks/Cole Publishing. 
Meyers, Marcia K., Norma K. Riccucci, and Irene Lurie. 2001. “Achieving Goal Congruence: 
The Case of Welfare Reform.” Journal of Public Adminsitration and Research Theory. 
11(2): 165-201.  
Miller, Warren E. 1999. “Temporal Order and Causal Inference.” Political Analysis 8:119-46. 
Mink, Gwendolyn. 2002. “Violating Women: Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State,”  
 36
In Lost Ground, Randy Albelda and Ann Withorn, eds., Cambridge, MA: South End 
Press. 
Morgen, Sandra. 2001. The Agency of Welfare Workers: Negotiating Devolution, Privatization, 
and the Meaning of Self-Sufficiency. American Anthropologist 103 (3): 747-761. 
Nathan, Richard P. 1996. “The Devolution Revolution: An Overview.” Rockefeller Institute 
Bulletin. Rockefeller Institute of Government, State University of New York, pp.5-13.  
Nathan, Richard P. and Thomas L. Gais. 1999. Implementing the Personal Responsibility Act of 
1996: A First Look. Rockefeller Institute of Government. Albany, NY: State University 
of New York.   
Osbourne, David. 1988. Laboratories of Democracy. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Pavetti, LaDonna, Michelle Derr, Gretchen Kirby, Robert Wood, and Melissa Clark. 2004. “The 
Use of TANF Work-Oriented Sanctions in Illinois, New Jersey and South Carolina.” 
Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.  
Pavetti, LaDonna, Michelle K. Derr, and Heather Hesketh. 2003. “Review of Sanction Policies 
and Research Studies: Final Literature Review.” Report prepared for Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Mathematica Policy Research, 
Washington, D.C. 
Pavetti, LaDonna A., Kathleen A. Maloy, Peter Shin, Julie Darnell, and Lea Scarpulla-Nolan. 
1998. “A Description and Assessment of State Approaches to Diversion Programs and 
Activities under Welfare Reform.” Report prepared for Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Planning and Evaluation, Mathematica Policy Research, Washington, D.C. 
Prottas, Jeffrey M. 1979. People-Processing: The Street-Level Bureaucrat in Public Service 
Bureaucracies. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 
Ragin, Charles C. 2000. Fuzzy Set Social Science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Rector, Robert E. and Sarah E. Yousef. 1999. The Determinants of Welfare Caseload Decline. 
Report No. 99-04. Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation. 
Riccucci, Norma M. 2005. “Street-Level Bureaucrats and Intrastate Variation in the 
Implementation of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Policies." JPART. 15(1): 
89-111. 
Soss, Joe, Sanford F. Schram, Thomas Vartanian, and Erin O’Brien. 2001. “Setting the Terms of 
Relief: Explaining State Policy Choices in the Devolution Revolution.” American 
Journal of Political Science. 45(2): 378-95. 
Soss, Joe. 2000. Unwanted Claims: The Politics of Participation in the U.S. Welfare System. Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Weaver, R. Kent. 2000. Ending Welfare as We Know It.  Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution 
Press.  
Weissert, Carol S. 1994.  “Beyond the Organization: The Influence of Community and  
Personal Values on Street-Level Bureaucrats' Responsiveness.”  Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory: Vol. 4, No. 2. (Apr.), pp. 225-254. 
Westra, Karen and John Routely. 2000. “Arizona Cash Assistance Exit Study, First Quarter 1998 
Cohort.”Arizona Department of Economic Security.   
Wu, Chi-Fang, Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer, and Geoffrey Wallace. 2004. How Do Welfare 
Sanctions Work? Madison, WI: Institute for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper 
no.1282-04.   
Yin, Robert K.. 2003. Case Study Research: Design and Methods.  Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications. 
 37
Table 1.  Selected Characteristics of the Florida and U.S. Adult TANF 
Populations 
 
 
 
Client Characteristics 
Total Florida 
Adult 
(2000 – 2004) 
Total U.S. 
Adult 
(FY 2002) 
   
Ethnicity / Race   
    White 33.7 31.6 
    Black 36.2 38.3 
    Hispanic 28.5 24.9 
   
Gender   
    Female 83.6 90 
    Male 16.4 10 
   
Single-Parenta 73.7 75.5 
   
Citizenship   
     Yes 83.3 92.5 
     No 16.7 7.5 
   
Ageb   
    18-19 7.1 7.5 
    20-29 43.1 44.9 
    30-39 32.5 29.9 
    40+ 17.5 17.7 
    Average 30.9 31 
   
Education   
    <12 years 52.8 45.2 
      12 years 34.3 51.4 
    >12 years 12.9 3.3 
       Median 11 12 
   
Residence   
     Broward (Ft. Lauderdale) 7 --- 
     Dade (Miami) 26.4 --- 
     Duval (Jacksonville) 3.9 --- 
     Hillsborough (Tampa) 4.9 --- 
     Orange (Orlando) 8.2 --- 
     Palm Beach (West Palm Beach) 4.2 --- 
     Pinellas (St. Petersburg) 5.7 --- 
     Rest of State 39.7 --- 
   
Total Adult Unduplicated  
Caseload 1/2000 – 4/2004 
 
268,620 
 
--- 
 
Source: For Florida statistics, data are calculated from TANF administrative data provided by the Florida DCF.  For 
national statistics, see Office Family Assistance, Sixth Annual Report to Congress: 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/annualreport6/chapter10/chap10.htm 
aDefined in Florida as only parent in TANF family. For U.S., it is defined as unmarried TANF adults. 
b In Florida, based on age at first month of TANF receipt during study period. 
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Table 2.  Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Effect of Individual and Community-Level 
Characteristics on Sanction Initiation 
 
Independent Variables 
 
I 
          
II 
 
III 
 
IV 
     
Individual Characteristics     
Gender (male ) 1.209** 1.201**    1.196** 1.182** 
Age .988** .989**   .990**  .990** 
Single-Parent .888** .876**        .857** .840** 
Wage Income(t-1) .989** .991**        .990**       .990* 
Education (reference = >H.S.)     
     Less than H.S. Education 1.454** 1.465**  1.456** 1.442** 
     H.S. Education 1.122** 1.128**  1.128** 1.120** 
Race/Ethnicity (reference=white)     
     Black      
           3 months    .876* .943* .953* .954* 
           6 months 1.035 1.123** 1.134**   1.129** 
           9 months   1.223* 1.338** 1.349** 1.336* 
    Hispanic     
           3 months   .781** .867*   .931**     .925** 
           6 months       .866       .967 1.042 1.076 
           9 months       .960      1.078 1.165 1.251 
 
Political Environment 
    
Local Conservatism Index --- 1.668**  1.405** 1.636** 
Black% --- ---        .997        .996 
Hispanic% --- ---   .990**        .996 
 
Socio-Economic Environment 
    
Annual Wage -      
   Food Service/Drinking Places 
 
--- 
 
--- 
     
       .974 
 
.963 
Unemployment Rate(t-1) --- ---      1.014      1.010 
Poverty Rate --- ---  1.035**  1.038** 
Population (in millions) --- ---  1.278**  1.351** 
 Per Capita TANF Caseload (t-1)           ---          ---        .847**       .866** 
Month of Year --- --- (see Fig. 7) (not reported) 
     
Number of Subjects 
Number of Failures 
Time at Risk (Person-Months) 
64,630 
25,337 
183,111 
64,630 
25,337 
183,111 
64,630 
25,337 
183,111 
55,354 
22,511 
152,338 
     
*p<.05, **p<.01 
 
Note: The sample for this analysis is consists of all new TANF clients who entered TANF from January 
2001 through December 2002.  All clients are observed for a maximum of twelve months (clients who 
exit without being sanctioned, or who were sanctioned after twelve months, are treated as censored). Cell 
entries are hazard ratios, and reflect the proportional change in the hazard of sanction, given a one-unit 
increase in the independent variable of interest. P-values are based on robust standard errors (adjusted for 
error clustering at the county level).  
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Figure 1. Relationship between County Conservatism Index and Average County 
Conservative Identification (Survey-Based) 
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Figure 2. Total Adult TANF Caseload by Race/Ethnic Identification, 
January 2000-December 2003 
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B.  Adult Caseload, by Race/Ethnicity 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
20
00
01
20
00
04
20
00
07
20
00
10
20
01
01
20
01
04
20
01
07
20
01
10
20
02
01
20
02
04
20
02
07
20
02
10
20
03
01
20
03
04
20
03
07
20
03
10
Year-Month
N
um
be
r o
f T
A
N
F 
A
du
lts
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
 
 41
Figure 3. Monthly TANF Sanctions, Exits, and Sanction Rates in Florida,  
January 2000 – December 2003 
 
A. Total TANF Sanctions and Non-Sanction Exits 
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B.  TANF Sanction Rates (% of TANF Adult Caseload) 
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Figure 4. Percentage  of TANF Adults Sanctioned During First TANF Spell (Average of 24 
Cohorts Entering TANF from January 2001 – December 2002) 
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Figure 5. Relationship between County Sanction Rate and Local Conservatism 
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Figure 6.  Cumulative Survival Rates for a Typical TANF Adult, by Local Political 
Ideology 
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Note: Survival rates are estimated for a 31 year-old white woman with 12 years of education and 
average level of wage income.  These estimates are based on the results presented in column II of 
Table 2. 
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Figure 7. Estimated Hazard Ratio and Total Tourism/Recreation Taxable Sales,  
by Month of Year 
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 Source: Hazard ratios are taken from the model reflected in column III of Table 2. Sales data 
reflect 2002, and are reported by Visit Florida (Florida Visitor Report 2003). 
 
 
